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ABSTRACT—The U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers has its origins in 
the British idea of the desirability of a Mixed Regime where the King, the 
Lords, and the Commons all checked and balanced one another as the three 
great estates of the realm. Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, 
and Machiavelli all argued that Mixed Regimes of the One, the Few, and 
the Many were the best forms of regimes in practice because they led to a 
system of checks and balances. The Enlightenment killed off the Mixed 
Regime idea forever because hereditary office-holding by Kings and Lords 
became anathema. The result was the birth of a functional separation of 
legislative, executive, and judicial power as an alternative system of checks 
and balances to the Mixed Regime. For better or worse, however, in the 
United States, Congress laid claim to powers that the House of Lords and 
the House of Commons historically had in Britain, the President laid claim 
to powers the King historically had in Britain, and the Supreme Court has 
functioned in much the same way as did the Privy Council, the Court of 
Star Chamber, and the House of Lords. We think these deviations from a 
pure functional separation of powers are constitutionally problematic in 
light of the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III, which confer on 
Congress, the President, and the courts only the legislative, executive, and 
judicial power. The United States badly needs a rebirth of the functional 
separation of powers idea. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a privilege and an honor for us to write about the legacy of Justice 
John Paul Stevens with respect to the executive power specifically and the 
separation of powers more generally. Justice Stevens has had a huge impact 
on this subject, which all of us care about deeply. Justice Stevens was the 
author of two of the most momentous and consequential separation of 
powers opinions of the last thirty years: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC1 and 
Clinton v. City of New York.2 In the first case, Justice Stevens wrote a 
seminal opinion for the Court arguing for deference by courts to reasonable 
executive branch interpretations of law3—a view that he later wisely 
qualified in subsequent cases when some of his colleagues tried to take it 
too far.4 In the second case, Justice Stevens limited presidential power by 
holding unconstitutional a statute that purported to give the President a line 
item veto by delegating enormous impoundment powers to the President.5 
The Chevron opinion and its progeny recognized that the President and his 
executive subordinates are often functionally lawmakers.6 The Clinton case 
sets outer limits on Congress’s power to delegate its appropriations power 
to the President.7 
Taken together, these two cases suggest that the very idea of the 
separation of powers is in a state of crisis today. Congress often passes 
sweeping delegations of legislative power to the Executive Branch,8 thereby 
placing courts in a quandary when they are called upon to review the 
 
1  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2  524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
3  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844–45. 
4  Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448, 453 (1987) (reading Chevron less 
expansively in the majority opinion than Justice Scalia did in his dissent), with United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (joining Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court limiting Chevron 
deference to occasions when Congress intended rulings of an administrative agency to have the force of 
law). 
5  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 446–47. 
6  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
7  A brief history of separation of powers decisions and the Clinton decision are explained and 
discussed in Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist Court: The Centrality of 
Clinton v. City of New York, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 77–87 (2004). 
8  See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(containing over three hundred instances of delegations of power phrased “the Secretary may” take 
certain actions as well as over one thousand uses of the formulation “the Secretary shall”). 
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legality of agency regulations and orders. Justice Stevens’s opinion calling 
for judicial deference to reasonable executive branch interpretations of law 
in Chevron recognizes that quandary while his later opinions and votes 
limiting the scope of Chevron reflect the Justice’s desire to preserve as 
much of the separation of powers as possible by allowing for judicial 
review.9 Congress also tried with the Line Item Veto Act to surrender part 
of the traditional legislative prerogative of the power of the purse to the 
President.10 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, struck that particular 
delegation down.11 
Chevron and Clinton v. City of New York raise fundamental questions 
about the separation of powers. How did we get to a world where executive 
branch agencies routinely make law and where Congress tries by statute to 
surrender the most ancient of legislative prerogatives? Was Justice Stevens 
right to create Chevron deference and then to try to confine that deference 
in subsequent case law? Was he right to strike down the Line Item Veto Act 
as, in essence, a violation of bicameralism and presentment and therefore as 
being an unconstitutional delegation of power? We believe the answer is 
that Justice Stevens ruled correctly in all of these cases, but to explain why 
requires a brief historical review: first, we must consider how the doctrine 
of the separation of powers initially arose; second, we must consider how 
two centuries of practice have shaped the separation of powers doctrine 
here in the United States into a workable whole; and finally, we must 
consider what concrete steps Justice Stevens took on the Court to try to 
reinvigorate the separation of powers and how we all might supplement his 
efforts today. We will discuss each of these three topics in turn. 
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
We begin with the question of how the idea of the separation of powers 
arose in America in the first place. The answer is that the American concept 
of the constitutional separation of powers had its roots in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century English and colonial American constitutionalism.12 
Englishmen at this time—and from 1607 to 1776 the American colonists 
were Englishmen—believed that their constitution was among the world’s 
best. Englishmen thought they had inherited what certain ancient Greek and 
Roman philosophers had called a “Mixed Regime.”13 A Mixed Regime was 
 
9  See, for example, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448, and his 
vote in Mead, 533 U.S. at 220, 226–27. 
10  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436–38, 446; see Calabresi, supra note 7, at 85. 
11  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448–49. 
12  The classic treatments here are M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS (1967) and W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965). 
13  See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: 
PREVAILING WISDOM 220–21 (2008); CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, 
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one that combined elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy so as 
to obtain the best features of each of those pure regime types while avoiding 
the worst.14 
According to the advocates of a Mixed Regime, government by one 
person had the advantage of providing for energy in foreign policy, in the 
waging of war, and in the combating of powerful domestic special interests. 
Government by one person had the disadvantage, however, that it usually 
degenerated into tyranny.15 Government by a few people had the advantage 
that the wise and the virtuous might rule. But it had the disadvantage that it 
could easily degenerate into a self-interested and corrupt oligarchy.16 
Government by all of the people had the advantage that it promoted liberty 
and brought popular common sense into public policymaking. But it had the 
disadvantage that it too could degenerate into mob rule, which is a tyranny 
of the Many.17 
The great advantage of a Mixed Regime that combined the powers of 
the One, the Few, and the Many was that the three social classes 
represented by the monarch, the aristocrats, and the commoners could check 
and balance one another, thereby increasing the chance that each social 
class would rule justly.18 Power was dispersed in a Mixed Regime rather 
than concentrated in the hands of one social class. For this reason, 
Aristotle,19 Polybius,20 Cicero,21 St. Thomas Aquinas,22 and Machiavelli23 all 
 
ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 123–57 (1994); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 11 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1998) (1969). 
14  See, e.g., VILE, supra note 12, at 33–52. 
15  See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1286a8–20, 1286a33–35, 1289a38–b5, 1279b4–8; POLYBIUS, THE 
HISTORIES bk. VI, 7. 
16  See ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, 1286b3–19, 1289a38–b5; POLYBIUS, supra note 15, bk. VI, 8. 
17  Aristotle was the first constitutional theorist to argue normatively for the idea of a Mixed Regime. 
Aristotle categorized constitutional arrangements according to which social class held power. See 
ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, 1286b3–7, 1295a25–1296b11. A government of one person was a monarchy 
or a tyranny, a government of a few people was an aristocracy or an oligarchy, and a government of all 
the people was a commonwealth democracy or a situation of mob rule. Each of the three forms of 
government had an ideal state and a corresponding degraded state. See id. 1289a26–b10. Aristotle 
identified a Mixed Regime where power was shared by the One, the Few, and the Many as being the 
best regime that would often be realistically obtainable. See id. 1293b21–1294b40. 
18  See POLYBIUS, supra note 15, bk. VI, 10. 
19  See ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, 1265b33–1266a5, 1293b21–1294b40, 1309b18–1310a1. 
20  Polybius argued that governments follow an inevitable cycle of constitutional decay 
(anacyclosis). See POLYBIUS, supra note 15, bk. VI, 4, 57.1. According to Polybius, anarchy would 
drive people to support a king out of necessity. Eventually the King would abuse his power, and a group 
of elites would usurp the throne in order to establish an aristocracy. Id. bk. VI, 7–8. This aristocracy 
would eventually give way to the power of the people, who would reject the concentration of wealth in 
the elite social class; however, the rule of the Many would eventually deteriorate, ushering in a new 
period of anarchy. Id. bk. VI, 8–9. Polybius supported the Mixed Regime because he believed it would 
slow this cycle by making it difficult for one class to abuse the power of the government on its own. Id. 
bk. VI, 10. He argued that the Roman Republic, whose constitution he felt was responsible for its 
longevity, was one that created a Mixed Regime. See id. bk. VI, 11. 
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praised the idea of a Mixed Regime. And, as we shall see, it was the idea of 
a Mixed Regime with a system of checks and balances that was to become 
the parent of the idea of the separation of powers. Both systems share the 
same premise that “[p]ower tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.”24  
Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, and Machiavelli all praised ancient Sparta 
for being a Mixed Regime, and they attributed Sparta’s success as a polity 
in part to that fact.25 Polybius and Cicero also praised the Roman Republic 
 
21  Cicero’s support for the Mixed Regime grew out of his admiration for the Roman Republic. See 
CICERO, De Re Publica, in DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS II, XXIII (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., 1928) 
(1st century b.c.) [hereinafter CICERO, De Re Publica] (“[Q]uod proprium sit in nostra re publica, quo 
nihil possit esse praeclarius,” i.e., “[T]he unique characteristic of our own commonwealth [is] the most 
splendid conceivable . . . .”). At the time of Cicero’s writings, the Roman consuls, representing the rule 
of the One, had an executive prerogative power—especially during emergencies and military conflicts—
but their power was checked by the holding of annual elections. See id. II, XXXII; CICERO, De Legibus, 
in DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS, supra, III, VII [hereinafter CICERO, De Legibus]. The educated 
members of the Senate, representing the Few, developed and enacted the policies of the Republic, while 
popular assemblies, representing the Many, checked this power by voting on proposed legislation and 
electing consuls and other magistrates who might later serve in the Senate. See CICERO, De Re Publica, 
supra, II, XXXII–XXXIV; CICERO, De Legibus, supra, III, X. Rather than seeking to establish an ideal 
constitution, Cicero proposed changes to the Roman Republic, such as increasing the authority of 
senatorial decrees. See CICERO, De Legibus, supra, III, III; see also ANDREW LINTOTT, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 225–32 (1999) (describing the changes that Cicero proposed 
in De Legibus). 
22  St. Thomas Aquinas modified the earlier version of the Mixed Regime to account for the superior 
status of the One. St. Thomas argued that a Mixed Regime structure would provide more stability for 
monarchies by reducing the likelihood that the Few or the Many would revolt. See ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, De Regimine Principum, in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 181, bk. I, ch. 6 
(Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953) [hereinafter AQUINAS, De Regimine Principum]. St. Thomas also reconciled 
the Mixed Regime with his Christian faith, thus making the doctrine relevant for both politicians and 
theologians living in Europe. St. Thomas compared Mixed Regimes to the government instituted by 
Moses, which included the supreme power of Moses, a group of seventy-two elders, and the 
participation of all men in the selection of the elders. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, in 
THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 3, supra, I-II Q.105 [hereinafter AQUINAS, Summa 
Theologica]. 
23  In contrast to St. Thomas, Machiavelli argued for a form of the Mixed Regime where the power 
of the Many was supreme rather than the power of the One. See MACHIAVELLI, Discourses, in II THE 
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC WRITINGS OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 93, bk. I, ch. VI 
(Christian E. Detmold trans., Cambridge, Riverside Press 1882) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLI, Discourses]. 
Machiavelli argued that the people were the class best situated to governing because the wealthier 
classes could use their riches to quickly implement abusive policies. Id. bk. I, ch. V. Machiavelli brought 
back Polybius’s cycle of constitutional decline, repeating Polybius’s argument that the Mixed Regime 
had slowed the fall of the Roman Empire. Id. bk. I, ch. II. Machiavelli specifically praised the Republic 
of Venice as constituting an ideal Mixed Regime since it featured a senate, a greater council, and a civil 
and military leader who was elected for life. See id. bk. I, ch. VI. 
24  Letter from Lord Acton to Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in LORD ACTON, ESSAYS ON 
FREEDOM AND POWER 329, 335 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1972). 
25 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, 1265b33-1266a5; CICERO, De Re Publica, supra note 21, II, 
XXIII; MACHIAVELLI, Discourses, supra note 23, bk. 1, ch. VI; POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES, supra note 
15, bk. VI, 10. 
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for being a Mixed Regime,26 and it should be noted for the record that the 
Roman Republic lasted for more than four hundred years (509 B.C. to 44 
B.C.). Machiavelli praised the Republic of Venice as being a Mixed 
Regime,27 and it should be noted for the record that the Republic of Venice 
lasted for more than one thousand years (697 A.D. to 1797 A.D.). By the 
seventeenth century, the idea of the Mixed Regime appeared to be 
triumphant in political philosophy.  
Beginning at least in 1640, and continuing on into the eighteenth 
century, many Englishmen believed that England was a kind of Aristotelian 
Mixed Regime. Many Englishmen thought that the King, the House of 
Lords, and the House of Commons each represented the three great estates 
of English society—the One, the Few, and the Many.28 All three estates 
were subordinate to the law and to the ancient constitution of King Edward 
the Confessor, including even the King.29 Sovereignty rested in the King-in-
Parliament because when the three great estates of the realm spoke together, 
society as a whole had made a decision.30 Thus, neither the King nor his 
judges could question or suspend or judicially review an Act of Parliament 
because the King-in-Parliament was sovereign when that act was adopted.31 
Americans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also believed 
that they lived in a colonial version of the Mixed Regime. Every colony 
eventually came to have a royal governor, appointed by the King of 
England, who represented the interests of the One; a Governor’s Council, 
usually appointed by the Governor with the King’s consent to advise him, 
who represented the interests of the Few; and a popularly elected lower 
House of the Colonial Legislature, which represented the interests of the 
Many and most especially the interests of those who paid taxes.32 The 
English Mixed Regime structure was thus replicated in the American 
 
26 See CICERO, De Re Publica, supra note 21, II, XXIII; POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES, supra note 15, 
bk. VI, 10. 
27 See MACHIAVELLI, Discourses, supra note 23, bk. 1, ch. VI. 
28  See GWYN, supra note 12, at 24–27; VILE, supra note 12, at 38. 
29  GWYN, supra note 12, at 30. 
30  The term “King-in-Parliament” refers to the King approving a bill that has been passed by the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 9 (1999). The idea is that the King acted together with the 
aristocracy and the common people. The King-in-Parliament was sovereign because it represented the 
three great estates of society. Today in England, the Monarch is a cipher, as is the House of Lords; the 
sovereignty of the Queen-in-Parliament means, in practice, the sovereignty of the House of Commons. 
See id. at 125 (“[T]he King’s power to make Acts of Parliament, with the assent of the Lords and 
Commons, is ‘the most sovereign and supreme power above all and controllable by none.’”); see also 
GWYN, supra note 12, at 30 (noting that the King was bound by laws made in Parliament). 
31  William Blackstone says as much in his COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, *185–86, 
contradicting the contrary view of Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 
(K.B.) 652–53; 8 Co. Rep. 113 b, 117 b–118 b. 
32  See JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE 
SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES 1689–1776, at 12 (1963). 
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colonies from 1607 until 1776.33 
The death of feudalism and the coming of the American Revolution 
killed off the idea of the Mixed Regime for all time. The American 
Revolution was premised on the idea that all men are created equal,34 and it 
did not permit a hereditary monarchy, aristocracy, or any other distinctions 
of social class.35 All power was thus to be in the hands of the Many. So 
beginning in the 1650s, after the English Civil War, and continuing with the 
writings of John Locke36 and Montesquieu,37 an effort was made by political 
philosophers to come up with a replacement for the Mixed Regime whereby 
the Many ruled but whereby power would not be concentrated in any one 
institution that could be easily corrupted.38 The idea that emerged from this 
 
33  Several American colonists praised the British Mixed Regime government during this period of 
time and supported efforts to replicate it in the colonies. According to M.J.C. Vile, “[B]y the middle of 
the eighteenth century the theory of the balanced constitution seemed as impregnably established in 
America as it was in England.” VILE, supra note 12, at 125. 
34  See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
35  Vile notes that when colonies began to move towards revolution, “the theory of mixed 
government as applied in England was first criticized on the grounds that corruption had so warped the 
Constitution that it no longer represented a truly balanced structure but was a disguised tyranny.” VILE, 
supra note 12, at 125–26. Authors such as Thomas Paine helped transform this criticism into a 
wholesale rejection of Mixed Regime government due to its emphasis on hereditary social class status. 
See id. at 136. 
36  See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION (J.W. Gough ed., 1948) (1690) (arguing both that government rests on the 
consent of the people and for a functional separation of powers). 
37  See generally 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., J.V. Prichard ed., 
1914) (1748) (arguing that a functional separation of powers is necessary to avoid tyranny). 
38  In 1648, Charles Dallison argued for a functional separation of powers with different personnel in 
each branch of the government. See CHARLES DALLISON, THE ROYALIST’S DEFENCE: VINDICATING THE 
KING’S PROCEEDINGS IN THE LATE WARRE MADE AGAINST HIM 126 (1648). However, “in one major 
respect it adhered to the theory of mixed government” by giving the King broad powers. VILE, supra 
note 12, at 47. John Sadler and other writers developed similar constitutional theories in subsequent 
years. See id. at 31–32. 
The execution of Charles I at the end of the English Civil War catalyzed efforts to create a 
constitutional system rooted in the sovereignty of the Many. See VILE, supra note 12, at 47–52. In 1653, 
the Instrument of Government established England’s first written constitutional system, the first 
Protectorate Parliament. THE ORIGINAL INSTRUMENT AND REPUBLICAN SCHEME OF GOVERNMENT 
(London, A. Moore 1722) (1653). Though the Protectorate was short-lived, it entrusted supreme 
legislative power in the Parliament and included a modest effort at a separation of powers. See VILE, 
supra note 12, at 47–48. At this point in time, the separation of powers was well on its way to becoming 
an established theory, “but it was a relatively unsophisticated doctrine, . . . [and] suffered from the fact 
that no real attempt was made . . . to ensure that deadlock did not result from the separation of functions 
in separate hands.” Id. at 52. 
In the late 1650s, George Lawson argued for a threefold separation of powers but only for a twofold 
separation of personnel, adhering to the earlier division of powers between legislative and executive 
personnel. See GEORGE LAWSON, AN EXAMINATION OF THE POLITICAL PART OF MR. HOBBS HIS 
LEVIATHAN (London, Francis Tyton 1657); GEORGE LAWSON, POLITICA SACRA & CIVILIS: OR, A 
MODELL OF CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICALL GOVERNMENT (London, John Starkey 1660); VILE, supra 
note 12, at 55–58. According to M.J.C. Vile, “The Restoration introduced a long period in which the two 
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effort was the idea that it was desirable to separate functionally the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial power.39 This functional 
separation of powers would thus replace the Mixed Regime’s division of 
powers among the three social classes. Tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule 
would be avoided thanks to the functional separation of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers. 
In the 1770s and 1780s, John Adams, who had been a big fan of the 
British Constitution’s Mixed Regime, led a successful campaign to induce 
Americans to adopt separation of powers and bicameralism because he 
thought it would lead to a new democratized version of the Mixed 
Regime.40 Popularly selected presidents and governors would replace the 
 
doctrines [mixed government and separation of powers] were combined in an amalgam which 
recognized the class element in the control of the legislative power.” VILE, supra note 12, at 34. Soon 
afterwards, “[w]hen democratic movements gained the ascendancy the theory of mixed government 
dropped out, and the theory of the separation of powers became the major theory of constitutional 
government.” Id. In 1701, the Act of Settlement established judicial independence in England by 
recognizing judicial tenure for life during good behavior. See id. at 54. 
39  Aristotle may have anticipated the separation of powers when he wrote that “[a]ll constitutions 
have three parts. . . . One of the three deliberates about public affairs; the second concerns the 
offices ; . . . and the third is what decides lawsuits.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, 1297b36–1298a5.  He 
never really develops this insight nor does Aristotle talk about the importance of keeping these three 
functions separate and balanced with one another. John Locke envisioned a twofold division of 
government powers between the executive, which had the executive and foreign affairs powers, and the 
legislature, which had lawmaking power. LOCKE, supra note 36, at 72–73. John Locke’s Second 
Treatise on Government represented a step forward for the functional separation of powers doctrine. 
Locke argued both for the rule of the Many and for the independence of judges. See VILE, supra note 12, 
at 60–63. Locke also helped bring about the supremacy of the legislature in constitutional theory, as 
opposed to the monarch or executive. Locke, along with other eighteenth-century writers, 
“[transformed] the demand that the King be the sole executive . . . into the very different demand that he 
be solely concerned with execution.” Id. at 43. 
Montesquieu’s De l’Espirit des Loix offered the first widely recognized articulation of the separation 
of powers doctrine as it is understood today. Though Montesquieu still viewed the legislative and 
executive powers as the two major branches of the government, he argued for a politically independent 
judiciary whose personnel would not be drawn from the legislative or executive branches of the 
government. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 37, at 163–65; VILE, supra note 12, at 88–89. Montesquieu 
famously declared that individual liberty depends upon a separation of both powers and persons, writing 
that “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of 
magistrates, there can be no liberty . . . . Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not 
separated from the legislative and executive.” MONTESQUIEU, supra note 37, at 163. Montesquieu also 
focused on ensuring the rule of the Many through the establishment of representative government. See 
id. at 165–67. 
Blackstone modified Montesquieu’s constitutional theory in the Commentaries on the Laws of 
England. Since “the Commentaries were regarded as authoritative in the American colonies as well as in 
England, it was often through Blackstone’s eyes that the colonists saw the Montesquieu theory.” VILE, 
supra note 12, at 102. Blackstone accorded much more authority to the judiciary than Montesquieu did, 
arguing that it was a “main preservative of the public liberty.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, *269. 
According to M.J.C. Vile, “Blackstone was an essential link between Montesquieu and Chief Justice 
Marshall,” VILE, supra note 12, at 104, and thus a bridge between the Framers and the earlier separation 
of powers theorists. 
40  In April of 1776, Adams wrote that a bicameral legislature was necessary because, “if the 
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King as the voice of the One; the Senate and the Supreme Court would 
replace the House of Lords, the Privy Council, and the Court of Star 
Chamber as the voice of the aristocratic or oligarchic Few; and the 
popularly elected House of Representatives would replace the House of 
Commons as the people’s special branch with the Power of the Purse. In the 
U.S. Constitution of 1787, there was a functional separation of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers, but it was supplemented by a Madisonian 
system of checks and balances whereby some powers with Mixed Regime 
antecedents were blended together so as to check and balance power.41 
Thus, the President was given a role in the lawmaking function by virtue of 
his possessing the veto power.42 The Senate was given a role in the 
execution of the law through its power to confirm or reject presidential 
nominees for high office and through its power over treaty ratification—
powers that the British Parliament had lacked.43 And, the Supreme Court 
and the inferior federal courts were arguably given some executive power 
as a result of their power to issue writs of mandamus to federal executive 
officials—something that only the Court of King’s Bench or the Court of 
Star Chamber could do in England because of the fiction that the King was 
a member of the Court of King’s Bench and because of the reality of his 
membership on the Court of Star Chamber.44 The power of the Many was 
 
legislative power is wholly in one Assembly, and the executive in another, or in a single person, these 
two powers will oppose and enervate upon each other, until the contest shall end in war.” JOHN ADAMS, 
THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT: APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES 
(1776), reprinted in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 85, 88–89 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979). In support of the 
separation of powers, Adams reasoned that the legislature, “possessed of all the powers of government, 
would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and 
adjudge all controversies in their own favour.” Id. at 88. 
41  Though the separation of powers doctrine and the Mixed Regime are related, the system of 
checks and balances is more closely related to the Mixed Regime. The separation of powers doctrine by 
itself is inconsistent with the Mixed Regime because it would entrust each of the legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers in three separate institutions. The theorists who developed the Mixed Regime were 
concerned not only with dividing the power of the government generally, but also with ensuring that no 
single group would possess sole control over an important government function. The tripartite structure 
of government prescribed by the Mixed Regime remained after the American Revolution made social 
classes irrelevant, but this connection to the Mixed Regime is more indirect than the system of checks 
and balances. The concern associated with the Mixed Regime that no one part of the government should 
acquire too much power was the driving force behind the system of checks and balances, which ensures 
that the Supreme Court, each house of Congress, and the President do not have exclusive control over 
certain important government functions. See Allison Bates, The Republican Balance: The Guarantee 
Clause, the Framers’ Republic, and the Popular Initiative 64–66 (Dec. 23, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
42  MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (2010). 
43  Id. 
44  Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614, 620–22 (1838) (discussing the 
Court of King’s Bench); see also ALBERT VENN DICEY, THE PRIVY COUNCIL: THE ARNOLD PRIZE 
ESSAY 101 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1887) (“[There is] a peculiar feature of the [Court of] Star 
Chamber’s constitution,—the frequent presidency of the King in person. The legal fiction that the King 
is present personally in all his courts, was here carried into act. . . . The part taken by the King was no 
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rendered supreme over time because of their role in a six-year cycle of three 
separate elections: (1) in electing all of the members of the House of 
Representatives; (2) in electing, since the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913, all of the senators who also play a key role in 
choosing the Justices of the Supreme Court;45 and (3) in electing all of the 
members of the Electoral College who then elect the President of the United 
States.46 All the power of all the institutions of the U.S. government comes 
from officials who are picked, either directly or indirectly, by all of the 
people. In the United States, the Many rule because the Many get to pick 
the One and the Few in our democratized version of the English Mixed 
Regime. 
The answer to our first question, then, is that the separation of powers 
arose to replace the Aristotelian and English Mixed Regime as a way of 
diffusing power once the fall of feudalism had made the English Mixed 
Regime unviable in the United States. Hereditary Kings and Lords would 
no longer be tolerated, so other institutions were needed to take their place. 
II. TWO CENTURIES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS PRACTICE 
The second question we want to address is how more than two 
centuries of practice have shaped the doctrine of the separation of powers as 
we understand it in the United States. The answer, in our view, is that all 
three branches of the federal government—the Legislative Branch, the 
Executive Branch, and the Judicial Branch—have taken on vitally 
important “functions” that are not assigned to them by the Constitution and 
that are inconsistent with a pure separation of powers functional theory. 
Let us start, as the Constitution does, with the Congress. The Congress 
today is for better or for worse knee-deep in the business of overseeing the 
execution of the law. Congress maintains an elaborate set of oversight and 
appropriations committees and subcommittees that follow everything the 
Executive Branch tries to do and that limit and constrain the President in 
law execution at every turn.47 The congressional committees are, in effect, a 
shadow parliamentary government that duplicates the presidential 
appointees in every policy area and that competes with the presidential 
appointees for the loyalty of the career bureaucracy.48 The only reason 
members of Congress do not demand that they themselves be appointed to 
 
empty formality. On one occasion James presided for five days, ‘seated on a chair high above the rest,’ 
and terminated the case by pronouncing a sentence, of which, if the annalist is to be believed, the 
wisdom surpassed that of any judgment before uttered from an English tribunal.”). 
45  PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 201. 
46  Id. 
47  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 
REV. 23, 48–55 (1995). 
48  See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or 
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1048 n.11, 1090 (1994). 
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the Cabinet and the sub-Cabinet is because the Incompatibility Clause of 
Article I, Section 6 forbids members of Congress from holding executive or 
judicial offices. 
As a matter of practice, Congress has carved out for itself a huge role 
in law execution through the oversight and appropriations processes.49 This 
role is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, which does not specifically 
provide for legislative committees, and it is in important ways 
extraconstitutional. Congress has also claimed for itself extensive quasi-
executive and quasi-judicial powers to investigate almost anything under 
the sun, and it claims that it can, in theory, have an officer of either house 
imprison a contumacious witness with no prosecution being brought by the 
Executive Branch and with no adjudication by the Judicial Branch.50 Such 
 
49  See Calabresi, supra note 47, at 51–54. 
50  The question of congressional power to punish first came before the Supreme Court in 1821 when 
John Anderson attempted to bribe a member of the House of Representatives. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 215 (1821). Justice Johnson’s opinion in Anderson begins with the premise that 
“such a power, if it exists, must be derived from implication, and the genius and spirit of our institutions 
are hostile to the exercise of implied powers.” Id. at 225. Justice Johnson cautioned that the ability of the 
House to claim an implied power “on the plea of necessity . . . is unquestionably an evil to be guarded 
against,” but he felt that rejecting Congress’s claim to the power to punish for contempt would bring 
about “the total annihilation of the power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from 
contempts.” Id. at 228. Justice Johnson recognized that “there is no power given by the constitution to 
either House to punish for contempts, except when committed by their own members,” id. at 225, but he 
astonishingly decided to support Congress’s claim to such a power anyway because his own intuition 
caused him to think Congress ought to be able to punish contempt by nonmembers by itself imprisoning 
the contumacious witness absent any Executive Branch prosecution. Id. at 228–29. 
Justice Miller reexamined this question in Kilbourn v. Thompson, a case in which Congress had 
instructed one of its committees to investigate a private real estate pool. 103 U.S. 168, 171 (1880). In 
Kilbourn, Congress argued that its inherent power to punish for contempt without the Executive Branch 
bringing a prosecution was incidental to its general legislative powers and also derived from 
Parliament’s power to unilaterally incarcerate contumacious witnesses. Id. at 182–83. Citing a similar 
case from Britain, Kielley v. Carson, (1841) 13 Eng. Rep. 225 (P.C.), Justice Miller revealed that not 
even colonial British legislative bodies outside of Parliament were thought to hold the power to punish 
for contempt. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 188–89. Thus, the Privy Council held that the House of Assembly 
lacked power on its own to imprison contumacious witnesses because Parliament only held such power 
“by virtue of ancient usage and prescription” unique to that institution. Id. at 188. However, because 
Justice Miller found that the subject of the subpoena in Kilbourn was not properly within the jurisdiction 
of the House of Representatives, he did not uphold inherent congressional power to punish for contempt. 
Id. at 196. Instead, Justice Miller limited his holding to establishing that each house of Congress may not 
punish for contempt when investigating issues outside its jurisdiction. Id. at 197. Miller explicitly 
denounced any general power held by Congress to punish for contempt, arguing that Congress could 
only exercise that power “in a limited class of cases.” Id. 
Justice Miller’s narrow reasoning in Kilbourn was cast aside by Justice Van Devanter, whose 
opinion in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), offered a closer parallel to Anderson than to 
Kilbourn. Justice Van Devanter conceded that “there is no provision expressly investing either house 
with power to make investigations and exact testimony,” but he decided in favor of sweeping 
congressional power because “[i]n actual legislative practice, power to secure needed information by 
such means has long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate.” Id. at 161. Instead of heeding 
Justice Miller’s warning that Congress can only exercise the power to punish for contempt without the 
Executive Branch’s bringing a prosecution “in a limited class of cases,” Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 197, 
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an imprisonment would seem to present all the evils of a bill of attainder, 
but Congress claims that it has this extraordinary power because such a 
power was exercised in England by the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords.51 The two Houses of the English Parliament, however, possessed 
more than merely legislative power because they were two of the three 
components of a constitutionally Mixed Regime.52 They thus had the power 
of the Few and the Many. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has only 
the “legislative” power and that would not seem to include a power to try 
and punish contempts. The analogy of Congress to Parliament is thus a false 
one that obscures rather than sheds light on the scope of Congress’s real 
power. As a factual matter, however, Congress has claimed and has 
exercised the power to unilaterally imprison witnesses for contempt.53 
If the Congress is knee-deep in the business of law execution, it must 
also be said that the President is knee-deep in the business of lawmaking. 
Presidents functionally make law when they issue executive orders, 
proclamations, or signing statements,54 and when their subordinates 
 
Justice Van Devanter wrote that Congress can exercise that power in the course of investigating any 
subject within its proper jurisdiction. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 173–74. Justice Van Devanter concluded 
that the power of Congress to punish for contempt is a practical necessity which should be checked by 
the Court through decisions such as Kilbourn. Id. at 175–76. 
The trouble with the decisions in Anderson and McGrain is that they pit the utility of compelling 
testimony against the rights of the defendant without giving any attention to the separation of powers 
issues these cases present. Under the principle of the separation of powers, contempt of Congress ought 
only to result in deprivations of liberty or property where the Executive Branch has prosecuted the 
contumacious witness, a jury has convicted him, and the Article III federal courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of the conviction. Justice Black said rightly in United States v. Lovett that “legislative 
acts, no matter what their form, that apply . . . to named individuals . . . in such a way as to inflict 
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.” 328 
U.S. 303, 315–16 (1946). The Constitution only allows for deprivations of liberty and property when all 
three branches of the national government have signed off on the deprivation. 
51  Justice Powell expressed concern over legislative powers of punishment in INS v. Chadha, 
though there the issue was private bills for deportation as opposed to punishment for contempt. 462 U.S. 
919, 960 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued that “[w]hen Congress finds that a particular 
person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a 
judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers.” Id. More generally, Justice 
Powell argued that any adjudication undertaken by Congress amounted to “the exercise of unchecked 
power . . . not subject to any internal restraints . . . [or] procedural safeguards, such as the right to 
counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal.” Id. at 966. 
52  PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 292–94. 
53  See McGrain, 273 U.S. 135. 
54  Signing statements often operate as a constitutional means by which the President can 
communicate both with the public and with subordinate members of the Executive Branch. See 
generally Steven G. Calabresi & Daniel Lev, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 
4 FORUM 1 (2006). However, when signing statements are used as binding directives for members of the 
Executive Branch, they can become lawmaking in contravention of the separation of powers in two 
different ways. 
Signing statements become legislation when they interpret unreasonably the original public meaning 
of federal statutes. Despite the deference given to agency directives in accordance with Chevron, the 
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promulgate the many rules and regulations that fill the pages of the Federal 
Register.55 Presidential lawmaking is aided and abetted by Congress, which 
 
federal courts can and do strike down unreasonable executive interpretations of statutes as in Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001). If the President issues a signing statement that 
creates a policy clearly at odds with the relevant statute, he has unconstitutionally encroached upon the 
legislative power of Congress. 
Signing statements also change law and policy when they are used to decline to enforce provisions 
of statutes that are in fact constitutional. Critics of presidential signing statements say that when the 
provision in question is constitutional, the use of a signing statement to decline to enforce the disputed 
provision “is tantamount to exercising the line-item veto power held unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in Clinton v. New York.” Letter from Neal R. Sonnett, Chair, ABA Task Force on Presidential 
Signing Statements & the Separation of Powers Doctrine, to Cong. Leaders 22 (Jan. 17, 2007), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/antiterror/2007jan17_signingstmts_l.pdf. The ABA Letter, 
however, totally overlooks the fact that all three branches of the national government must be guided by 
their own independent judgments as to what the Constitution requires. If the President thinks that 
Congress and the federal courts have upheld a statute like the Sedition Act of 1798 because they were 
“clearly mistaken” as to the constitutional issue, the President must decline to bring prosecutions under 
the law in question. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 67 (2008). The clear mistake rule in constitutional 
law was put forth and defended by James Bradley Thayer in The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). This is in fact exactly what President 
Thomas Jefferson ordered with respect to the one Sedition Act prosecution he inherited from the Adams 
Administration. CALABRESI & YOO, supra, at 67. Jefferson ordered the prosecution to be stopped, and it 
was stopped. Id. 
Justice Stevens has argued that the original understanding of the Framers on the issue may well have 
been that signing statements could never be used in place of a veto to decline enforcement of 
unconstitutional legislation. As Justice Stevens explained in Clinton v. City of New York, “Our first 
President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either ‘approve all the parts 
of a Bill, or reject it in toto.’” 524 U.S. 417, 440 (1998) (quoting 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)). As a practical matter, two centuries of practice have 
established that the President may decline to enforce unconstitutional provisions of statutes that he or a 
former President has signed. See generally CALABRESI & YOO, supra, at 30–36 (arguing that 220 years 
of practice establishes such a power). 
55  In his concurring opinion in Whitman, Justice Stevens said that he agreed with Justice Scalia that 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) had constitutionally delegated the power to promulgate National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS). 531 U.S. at 487 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). However, Justice Stevens noted that “[i]f the NAAQS that the EPA promulgated had been 
prescribed by Congress, everyone would agree that those rules would be the product of an exercise of 
‘legislative power.’” Id. at 489. But, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his own concurrence in Whitman, 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in that case held that the CAA “[did] not delegate legislative power to the EPA.” 
Id. at 486 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia maintained that the CAA had delegated “decisionmaking 
authority” to the EPA but not legislative power. Id. at 472. Under Justice Stevens’s logic, Congress may 
delegate legislative power to executive agencies, just not too much. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 7, at 
85–86 (arguing that the Clinton v. City of New York opinion, which Justice Stevens wrote, subtly 
endorses the nondelegation doctrine). Under Justice Scalia’s logic, Congress may delegate 
decisionmaking authority, but not legislative power, to executive agencies. Justice Scalia explains this in 
his dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Both 
Justices agreed that there are some powers which Congress may choose either to exercise for itself or to 
delegate to the Executive Branch. Whenever Congress delegates too much of this power—as it often 
does—executive officers become lawmakers. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 85–86. While the precise 
extent of this practice in the present is impossible to quantify, there can be little doubt that there are at 
the very least some executive agencies that currently hold unconstitutional legislative power. The power 
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routinely delegates broad lawmaking power to presidential-Executive-
Branch subordinates and sometimes to the President himself.56 Congress 
especially likes to delegate lawmaking power to officials in so-called 
independent agencies which it can control through the congressional 
oversight process57 or, alternatively, to legislative courts.58 When Congress 
 
of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcasting in the public interest is a case in 
point. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(g), 307, 309, 310 (2006). The Act was upheld as constitutional by the 
Supreme Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 25–26 (1943). 
56  In the past, Congress has delegated broad authority to the President in both the foreign and 
domestic affairs areas, as the cases discussed below indicate. First, in Field v. Clark, the Court upheld a 
statute giving the President the power to levy predetermined duties or taxes based on his own 
determinations of whether trade policies between the United States and its trade partners were 
“reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.” 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892) (quoting McKinley Tariff Act, 26 
Stat. 567, 612 (1890)). Justice Harlan upheld the delegation, arguing that “it is often desirable, if not 
essential, for the protection of the interests of our people against the unfriendly or discriminating 
regulations established by foreign governments . . . [for Congress] to invest the President with large 
discretion in matters . . . relating to trade and commerce with other nations.” Id. at 691. Second, in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court upheld the power of the President to issue a 
proclamation pursuant to a congressional statute that expressly authorized the President to prohibit the 
sale of weapons if he felt that such action would “contribute to the reestablishment of peace.” 299 U.S. 
304, 312 (1936) (quoting Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 811). Justice Sutherland wrote that 
“congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the 
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory 
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.” Id. at 320. 
While Congress has not been shy about delegating similar authority to the President in the domestic 
affairs area, the Supreme Court has not given Congress the same level of deference with respect to 
domestic affairs delegations as it has given with respect to foreign affairs delegations. In A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, struck down a 
statute that would have empowered the President to promulgate “codes of fair competition” for domestic 
industries. 295 U.S. 495, 516 (1935). Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that the President needed merely a 
“statement of an opinion as to the general effect upon the promotion of trade or industry of a scheme of 
laws . . . in order to put into operation a legislative code.” Id. at 538. That same year, Chief Justice 
Hughes also decided Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, again ruling that Congress had not placed adequate 
limits upon a delegation of power to the President. 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). The statute in dispute 
authorized the President to issue executive orders prohibiting “the transportation in interstate and foreign 
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the 
amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation.” Id. at 
406 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that the statute gave “the President an unlimited 
authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see 
fit.” Id. at 415. Chief Justice Hughes acknowledged that “legislation must often be adapted to complex 
conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly,” but 
ultimately concluded that this “cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, 
if our constitutional system is to be maintained.” Id. at 421. As mentioned above, the Court struck down 
an attempt by Congress to delegate to the President sweeping impoundment powers in Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. at 421. 
57  Congress has used unconstitutional restrictions on the removal power to bring administrative 
agencies under its control. Under the for-cause removal requirements upheld in Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States, the President is often unable to remove executive officers for reasons related to policy. 
295 U.S. 602 (1935). When an executive officer meets the requirements of the for-cause removal 
requirements in Humphrey’s Executor—“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”—
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Congress and the President can both agree that the officer needs to be removed. Id. at 620 (quoting 
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (1914) (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). This means that the President can never really remove an executive officer subject to these 
types of for-cause removal requirements on his own. See generally CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 54, at 
417–31 (arguing that the President has never acquiesced in the constitutionality of such limits on the 
removal power). As a result, the President has no meaningful influence over—and more importantly, no 
meaningful accountability for—the policies implemented by his subordinates. See Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 729–31 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The question of statutory restrictions on the removal power first came before the court in Shurtleff v. 
United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903). Congress had created an “office of general appraiser of 
merchandise,” the holder of which “may be removed from office at any time by the President for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Id. at 313 (quoting Customs Administrative Act, 
ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (1890)). The general appraiser contended that this statutory language 
precluded the President from removing him from office for reasons beyond those expressly stated. Id. at 
315–16. Justice Peckham ruled that the President could remove the general appraiser for reasons not 
written into the statute, but noted that the general appraiser “is entitled to notice and a hearing” when the 
President seeks to remove him for the causes listed. Id. at 314. Justice Peckham reasoned that construing 
the statute to preclude the President from removing the general appraiser for causes beyond those in the 
statute would have the bizarre effect of giving the general appraiser life tenure. Id. at 316. The for-cause 
removal clause in Shurtleff gave an executive officer the opportunity to defend himself against 
allegations of “inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office,” but it in no way restricted the 
power of the President to remove executive officers. Id. at 317. 
In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court ruled that the inclusion of term limits in a statute that contained 
the exact same for-cause removal language as that analyzed in Shurtleff precluded the President from 
removing commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because “the fixing of a definite term 
subject to removal for cause . . . is enough to establish the legislative intent that the term is not to be 
curtailed in the absence of such cause.” Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 623. Justice Sutherland 
denied that the FTC was part of the Executive Branch, writing that the court instead faced “the serious 
question whether . . . members of these quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial bodies . . . continue in office 
only at the pleasure of the President.” Id. at 629. Justice Sutherland even supported the notion advanced 
by Congress that the FTC should be “independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free 
to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the 
government.” Id. at 625–26. This similarity to Article III judges belies Congress’s intent to give broad 
judicial powers to administrative agencies. 
The Court continued its narrowing of presidential removal power in Morrison v. Olson, where Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist ruled that Congress could create an office of an independent prosecutor—
removable only by the Attorney General—to investigate certain members of the Executive Branch. 487 
U.S. 654, 660–63 (1988). In his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out the flaw in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
assertion that for-cause removal requirements ensured that the independent prosecutor would be under 
the control of the Executive Branch. Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explained that 
“[w]hat we in Humphrey’s Executor found to be a means of eliminating Presidential control, the Court 
today considers the ‘most importan[t]’ means of assuring Presidential control.” Id. at 707 (alteration in 
original). Both Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor show that Congress implements strict for-cause 
removal requirements when it wishes to eliminate—not merely diminish—Presidential control over 
executive officers. 
In the most recent Supreme Court opinion to address this issue, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, Chief Justice Roberts articulately explained why the 
establishment of independent agencies and offices poses a serious constitutional problem. 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3153–55 (2010). In Humphrey’s Executor, Justice Sutherland discussed the independence of the 
FTC from executive power but declined to discuss the enormous influence of Congress on so-called 
independent agencies. See 295 U.S. at 625–26. Justice Sutherland’s opinion gives the impression that the 
elimination of executive influence over those agencies somehow makes them politically independent, 
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does this, it effectively supersedes the separation of powers by 
concentrating legislative and executive power in a few officials who are 
under the control of a powerful committee or subcommittee.59 It is telling 
that these committees and subcommittees are often captured by 
representatives or senators from districts or states which have a strong local 
interest in the federal policy in question. Thus, we find members of 
Congress from farm states on the Senate and House Agriculture 
Committees and members from Wall Street on the Finance or Ways and 
Means Committees.60 
Presidential power has also been augmented over the last 220 years by 
the claim first advanced by Alexander Hamilton during the Neutrality 
Controversy in 1793 that the President’s “executive Power” under Article II 
of the Constitution has given him all of the foreign policy powers possessed 
by British Monarchs except for those expressly reserved to the Senate, the 
Congress, or both.61 This is a plausible claim given expectations about King 
George III’s powers in 1787, but it suffers from the critical difficulty that 
the Constitution gives the President only the executive power and not the 
“royal” power as James Madison pointed out in response.62 As with 
unilateral congressional imprisonment for contempt, the British analogy is a 
 
when the truth is that Congress simply gains exclusive control, usually without proper accountability. As 
Chief Justice Roberts explained in Free Enterprise Fund, “Congress has plenary control over the salary, 
duties, and even existence of executive offices. Only Presidential oversight can counter its influence.” 
130 S. Ct. at 3156. While Roberts drew the line at two levels of for-cause removal restrictions, this 
constitutional problem persists with only one level of restrictions. 
58  The Supreme Court first upheld the constitutionality of legislative courts in the territories in 
American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 543 (1828), and it subsequently allowed them 
in cases involving public benefits. See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280 (1855). 
Legislative courts were further extended to apply when administrative agencies were acting as 
adjuncts to an Article III court in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56–57 (1932). 
The appropriate extent of authority for administrative agencies and legislative courts is murky at 
best. As Gary Lawson observed, “the imposition of a civil penalty or fine is very hard to distinguish 
from the imposition of a criminal sentence (especially when the criminal sentence is itself a fine).” Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1247 (1994). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that many administrative agencies and legislative courts often exercise powers 
that, at the very least, approach those properly held by Article III judges. 
59  See Calabresi, supra note 49, at 54–55. 
60  Thus, for example, Senator Charles Schumer of New York sits on both the Senate Finance 
Committee and on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Committee 
Assignments, SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER, http://schumer.senate.gov/About%20Chuck/
committeeassignments.htm (last visited June 4, 2012). Both committees have a jurisdiction which is of 
real importance to New York State. 
61  PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 99–112 (2010) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, 
GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.), June 29, 1793). 
62  Id. at 105–12 (quoting JAMES MADISON, Letters of Helvidius No. 2 (Sept. 14, 1793); JAMES 
MADISON, Letters of Helvidius No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793)) (responding to Hamilton). 
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very imperfect one because Britain in 1787 had a Mixed Regime63 while the 
first three Vesting Clauses of the U.S. Constitution spoke the language of a 
functional separation of powers. Hamilton’s argument has mostly carried 
the day since 1793, but the fact remains that this is another respect in which 
the Enlightenment Project of creating a functional separation of powers has 
given way to a reversion to the Aristotelian Mixed Regime. 
Finally, we find today that the federal judiciary is also performing 
functions that go well beyond the judicial function of deciding particular 
cases and controversies. The federal courts often do this when they exercise 
their power of judicial review in a way that is broader than is called for to 
decide the cases or controversies before them. This occurred most 
dramatically in recent years in Roe v. Wade, where the Court made up out 
of thin air an elaborate trimester system for determining the legality of 
abortion laws that had no roots in the Constitution.64 As a result, the 
Supreme Court has come under sustained criticism for acting like an 
 
63  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
64  410 U.S. 113 (1973). When the Supreme Court issues an opinion mandating measures beyond the 
minimum requirements of the Constitution, it usurps the policymaking powers of Congress and the 
President. If the Court crafts its own general remedy for a constitutional violation, rather than simply 
declaring that a specific law or policy is unconstitutional, it limits the range of options from which 
Congress and the President may choose their own solution. The authors would also like to note that the 
second and third authors of this Essay do not share the view that Roe v. Wade represents such a 
usurpation of congressional and executive powers. 
An example of this misbehavior occurred in 1966 when the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. 
Arizona that prosecutors “may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective 
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Chief Justice Warren relied 
heavily upon the decision two years earlier in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), where the 
Supreme Court had ruled that statements made after a suspect had been denied requests to speak with an 
attorney were inadmissible. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440. In Escobedo, however, the Court had declined to 
establish any further requirements for prosecutors. 378 U.S. at 492. In contrast, Chief Justice Warren’s 
opinion in Miranda abandoned this approach in favor of establishing “concrete constitutional guidelines 
for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.” 384 U.S. at 442. The result was a series of four 
warnings and a requirement of an affirmative waiver, without which statements made in custodial 
interrogation could not be used in court. Id. at 444. Though the Court’s intention was to make matters 
clearer for law enforcement officials, Justice White correctly predicted that the holding left “open such 
questions as whether the accused was in custody, whether his statements were spontaneous or the 
product of interrogation, whether the accused has effectively waived his rights, and whether 
nontestimonial evidence introduced at trial is the fruit of statements made during a prohibited 
interrogation.” Id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting). 
Another similar example of the Supreme Court legislating from the bench came in Roe v. Wade, 
when the Court not only invalidated the abortion law in dispute, but also purported to establish elaborate 
legislative standards for the allowance of abortion laws in each of the three trimesters of pregnancy. 410 
U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973). Much in the same way that Justice Warren prescribed a warning in Miranda, 
Justice Blackmun detailed what he felt were the legally “‘compelling’ point[s]” during each of the three 
trimesters of pregnancy and the legal scope of regulation permissible during each trimester. Id. at 162–
63. Two decades later, the Court’s holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey modified Roe beyond recognition, saying that “[a] framework of this rigidity was unnecessary.” 
505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
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oligarchy of the robe. Moreover the Supreme Court is not only a major 
policymaker in the United States today when it decides Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process and Bill of Rights cases, but it is also 
the author of many federal common law rules and of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and of Civil and Criminal Procedure.65 Some of the lower federal 
courts have even gotten knee-deep into the business of law execution when 
they were in effect administering prisons or school districts subject to 
bussing orders, although the Prison Reform Litigation Act has helped to 
limit that.66 
The Supreme Court has thus revealed itself over the last 220 years to 
be an institution that favors the rule of social elites. During the Founding 
era, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall favored the 
Federalist elite.67 During the pre-Civil War era, the Supreme Court under 
Chief Justice Roger Taney favored the slave-holding elite.68 During the 
Lochner era, the Supreme Court favored business elites.69 And, most 
recently, during the modern era the Supreme Court has favored Harvard and 
Yale Law School cultural elites, who are liberal on social issues.70 It is 
striking in this respect that all nine of the current Supreme Court Justices 
went to Harvard or Yale for some portion of their legal training. As is the 
case with Congress and the President, our actual practice over the last 220 
years is one of Mixed Regime triumph. The Supreme Court and the federal 
judiciary confirmed by the Senate have come to replace the Privy Council, 
the Court of Star Chamber, and the House of Lords as the oligarchic or 
aristocratic component of the U.S. Mixed Regime. The Senate’s oligarchic 
tendencies, in turn, are augmented by a filibuster rule under which nothing 
of importance can be done unless one can get sixty out of one hundred 
votes. This filibuster rule is constitutionally problematic.71 
 
65  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules Enabling Act are cases in point. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (2006). 
66  Pub L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006)). See also, for 
example, the litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court saying in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
125–26 (1995), that under some circumstances judges can effectively order a tax increase. 
67  See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (broadly 
construing the Contracts Clause to protect elites at the state level); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 
87 (1810) (same). 
68  See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding ludicrously that free 
slaves could not become citizens of the United States and striking down the Missouri Compromise as 
unconstitutional); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (broadly construing the federal 
power to recover alleged fugitive slaves). 
69  Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding a federal law outlawing child labor 
unconstitutional); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding a sixty-hour limit on a workweek 
unconstitutional). 
70  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right to privacy to include a right to an 
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right to privacy in the penumbras 
and emanations of the Constitution). 
71  PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 283–84 (citing Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the 
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In our view, the Constitution’s grant of only the “judicial” power to the 
federal courts ought to preclude those courts from making law, as occurred 
in Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court’s oligarchic rule exemplified in Roe v. 
Wade is, in our opinion, an improper reversion to the Mixed Regime 
antecedent.72 The current Supreme Court wields the oligarchic powers of 
the Privy Council, the Court of Star Chamber, and the House of Lords. This 
is improper in a true separation of powers regime. 
The answer to our second question, then, is that over the last two 
centuries all three branches of the federal government have strayed 
markedly from a pure model of the functional separation of powers. The 
President, the Senate, the Supreme Court, and the House of Representatives 
are separate institutions from one another but they all exercise a blend of 
what Montesquieu would have called legislative, executive, and judicial 
power. 
III. SUGGESTED SEPARATION OF POWERS REFORMS 
This leads to our third and final question, which is what should we do 
today, if anything, to rectify the erosion of the functional separation of 
powers principles described above in Part II? Does the last 220 years of 
American constitutional history imply that a pure “functional” separation of 
powers is impossible to maintain? What should we make of the fact that the 
United States has reverted away from a functional separation of powers and 
toward a democratized version of the English Mixed Regime? How have 
Justice Stevens’s opinions in Chevron and Clinton affected the erosion in 
the functional separation of powers principles that we have discussed? We 
will comment here not only on Justice Stevens’s ideas but also on a few 
reform ideas that are relevant to each of three branches of the federal 
government. 
With respect to Congress, there is a huge problem, in our opinion, with 
Congress delegating too much legislative power to the President and to 
executive branch agencies. Justice Stevens’s opinion in the Chevron case 
worked to discourage unconstitutional delegations of power by putting 
Congress on notice that, if it delegated power, its institutional rival, the 
President, would be empowered and not the congressional oversight 
committees and subcommittees.73 Post-Chevron case law also made it clear 
that the federal courts would not abdicate their rightful power of judicial 
 
Constitution: When a Majority Is Denied Its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const., Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 32–46 (2003) 
(statement of Steven G. Calabresi, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law)). 
72  As mentioned supra note 64, the second and third authors of this Essay do not share this view. 
73  Justice Scalia has made this point many times in remarks at Federalist Society conferences, 
including most recently at a conference on the separation of powers which Professor Calabresi attended 
on September 1 and 2. Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the Federalist Society’s 2011 Separation of 
Powers CLE Course (Sept. 1–2, 2011). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 546 
review by deferring absolutely to agencies that were being micromanaged 
in the oversight process.74 Finally, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in 
Clinton v. City of New York explicitly prevented Congress from delegating 
part of its Power of the Purse to the President.75 This case also therefore 
addressed the danger of the President becoming too powerful relative to 
Congress.76 
We think Justice Stevens’s opinions in Chevron and its progeny and in 
Clinton v. City of New York are all helpful, but we think that real reform of 
the pathologies caused by the congressional committee system and its 
involvement in oversight can only come from Congress itself. Congress 
needs to take action to prevent its members from gravitating to, and staying 
for decades on, committees that are uniquely important to their home states. 
Congress should assign its members to committees randomly, the way 
federal courts of appeals panels are assigned their cases, and Congress 
should then adopt strict term limits for the number of years a member of 
Congress can serve on any one committee. Like Justice Stevens, we are 
skeptical of term limits on members of Congress,77 but we are in favor of 
term-limiting their service on congressional committees. We think it was 
unhealthy and corrupting to allow recent former Senators like Robert Byrd 
of West Virginia and Ted Stevens of Alaska to serve for decades on the 
Senate Appropriations Committee. 
We also think Congress should consider adopting a general sunset law 
that sunsets all federal statutes after a period of years except for those of 
quasi-constitutional status like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. Thomas Jefferson famously thought the Constitution 
should sunset every twenty years so the living would not be governed by 
the dead.78 We disagree with Jefferson on that, as did our personal hero 
 
74  The Court’s holdings in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (Benzene 
Case), 448 U.S. 607 (1980), and in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), make it 
clear that Chevron deference is not absolute. In order to reconcile the principle behind Chevron—that 
the Court should “respect legitimate policy choices” made by agency experts, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)—with the holding in the Benzene Case, Justice Stevens emphasized 
that “we [the Court] have neither made any factual determinations of our own, nor have we rejected any 
factual findings made by the Secretary.” Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 659. Rather, Justice Stevens felt that 
the Secretary of Labor had ignored a statutory requirement. Id. Similarly, Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Whitman rested upon a finding that the EPA had interpreted “the statute in a way that completely 
nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit its discretion.” 531 U.S. at 485. These opinions 
allow Congress to delegate power to executive agencies without the risk that those agencies will be able 
to use that power in a manner inconsistent with relevant statutes. 
75  524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998); see also Calabresi, supra note 7, at 85 (discussing the importance 
of the Clinton decision as a separation of powers decision). 
76  See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 446–47. 
77  See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (striking down 
state-imposed term limits on federal members of Congress). 
78  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON IN TWELVE VOLUMES 3, 9–10 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904); Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
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James Madison,79 but we do think that most federal statutes ought to sunset 
every twenty years. If a law is good and is working well, Congress and the 
President will reenact it. That is the way our democracy ought to work.80 
With respect to the Executive Branch, twenty-first-century Americans 
need to make sure that federal agencies are not under the thumb of 
congressional oversight and appropriations committees that are trying to 
bend the execution of federal law in some way that improperly benefits 
their home state or district. There are two solutions to this problem: the 
unitary Executive and judicial review. The unitary Executive puts the 
President, who is elected nationwide, in charge of law execution instead of 
a Senator or Representative, who represents only a state or a district.81 This 
counteracts interest group capture of agencies by the congressional 
committees. Judicial review, without too much Chevron deference, also 
ameliorates the problem of interest group capture of congressional 
committees and of the agencies they regulate. Finally, twenty-first-century 
Americans should demand that the administrative law judges in the various 
independent and executive branch agencies be given life tenure so that they 
are employed under Article III and not under Article II. The notion of 
allowing agencies both to prosecute and to adjudicate the same case ought 
to be clearly and decisively rejected. 
Finally, as to the federal courts, twenty-first-century Americans need 
narrow, more fact-specific decisions of the kind the Justices on the Roberts 
Court now seem to be rendering.82 The Court needs to reject the lawmaking 
judicial activism of cases like Roe v. Wade.83 We also think Congress ought 
to remove the Supreme Court from its current role as the promulgator of the 
 
to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), in 5 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON IN TWELVE 
VOLUMES, supra, at 360, 362. 
79  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, 1787–1790, at 437, 437 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). 
80  There are at least two counterarguments to this proposal worth mentioning. First, it could be 
argued that Congress has so much to do already that requiring it to revisit every section in the U.S. Code 
every twenty years would be too time-consuming to be practical. Such a demand would risk turning an 
opportunity for retrospection into an annual pro forma vote to continue the laws as written. Second, it 
could also be argued that each vote in Congress is an opportunity for members of Congress to 
grandstand and raise funds from affected groups. The ability to hold hostage long-settled law for 
purposes of fundraising from affected groups may risk increasing, rather than decreasing, public 
perceptions of corruption. Any sunset proposal would, of course, have to be carefully drafted and may 
be ineffective if not accompanied by other anticorruption reforms. 
81  Calabresi, supra note 47, at 59; Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed 
Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1700 (2009). 
82  There are signs that the Court has abandoned the activist approach employed in Miranda v. 
Arizona and Roe v. Wade. Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), like 
Miranda and Roe, dealt with controversial questions concerning individual rights; however, Justice 
Kennedy wrote judicially restrained opinions for the Court.   
83  As mentioned supra note 64, the second and third authors of this Essay do not share this view. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence and of Civil and Criminal Procedure.84 “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is,” not what it should be.85 The Supreme Court needs to get out of 
the business of lawmaking. Twenty-first-century America does not want or 
deserve to have a life-tenured Privy Council or Court of Star Chamber or 
House of Lords. 
CONCLUSION 
Why is the separation of powers so important and so worth fighting 
for? Because: 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must 
be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection 
on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses 
of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections 
on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it 
to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control 
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
auxiliary precautions.86 
Our Madisonian system of checks and balances has its origins in the 
Aristotelian idea of a Mixed Regime whereby the King, the Lords, and the 
Commons all checked and balanced one another. The Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution replaced the elitist and oligarchic Mixed Regime with a 
democracy and a move toward a pure functional separation of powers. We 
need to breathe new life into our functional system of a separation of 
powers. To do that, it helps to see how different in theory and in practice 
the British Constitution of 1787 was as compared to our own Constitution. 
The insight that links together the U.S. system of separation of powers and 
the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British Mixed Regime is a healthy 
skepticism toward great concentrations of power. This insight is correct, 
which is part of the reason why James Madison’s The Federalist No. 51 has 
become a canonical text. 
What remains to be seen, however, is whether the U.S. system of a 
functional separation of powers can be salvaged from the wreck of the 
British Mixed Regime. For better or worse, our Constitution has actually 
operated in practice over the last 220 years as a democratized version of the 
 
84  Justice Hugo Black objected to the adoption by the Supreme Court of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure on separation of powers grounds. See Order of Jan. 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 866 (1963). 
85  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
86  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
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Mixed Regime rather than as a functional separation of powers. The idea of 
the Mixed Regime is a whole lot older than the idea of the separation of 
powers, and it may well be more enduring. The writings of Aristotle, 
Polybius, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Machiavelli all illustrate this 
point. The way a regime works, in practice, may show the true nature of the 
regime. It may be the case that the U.S. Constitution inadvertently gave rise 
to a democratized version of the Mixed Regime. If so, then that is an error 
which our generation of Americans needs to correct. 
We do not think that the constitutional status quo with respect to the 
death of the separation of powers is acceptable. We think the United States 
badly needs a rebirth of the Enlightenment idea of the separation of powers 
through the adoption of the reforms proposed in Part III above. Just as the 
Founding Fathers revolted against hereditary Kings and Lords, so too must 
present-day Americans revolt against rule by congressional committees, by 
independent agencies, and by judges. Americans did not fight and die in the 
Revolutionary War to be governed by an oligarchy. We need to revive the 
functional separation of powers.  
Justice John Paul Stevens understood the central importance of the 
separation of powers during his thirty-five-year tenure on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Thanks in part to Justice Stevens’s herculean efforts in the Chevron 
case and its aftermath, and in Clinton v. City of New York, and in U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,87 the functional separation of powers in our 
government is somewhat stronger today than it was when he arrived on the 
Supreme Court in 1975. The decisions in Clinton v. City of New York and in 
U.S. Term Limits were essential to maintaining congressional power as a 
coequal branch to the presidency. Justice Stevens has left us a truly heroic 
legacy. 
 
87  514 U.S. 779 (1995). Congress would have lost substantial institutional power relative to the 
President and the states had the Supreme Court failed to strike down as unconstitutional state-imposed 
term limits on service in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Justice Stevens’s 5–4 opinion for 
the Court in U.S. Term Limits was thus of foundational importance both to the separation of powers and 
to federalism. 
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